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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DFDLE Y lH. A.MOSS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Cases
No.

vs.

"r·

HEBER BENNION, JR., VERA
BENNION, his wife, and BENNION RANCHING CO.MPANY,
a Corporation,
Defendants-Appellants.

, 10393

and

10482

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
NATURE OF CASE
This is an action to compel performance by defendants of an alleged contract to sell their ranch lands
and livestock to plaintiff.
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT
The defendants with their counsel and their witappeared before the lower court on April 28,

nesses

1

1965, prepared for the trial of this case as scheduled.

Before permitting the case to proceed to trial, however
and having disallowed and denied defendants' Offei'.
of Proof, and defendants having been permitted to offer
no evidence in the matter, the Court granted Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment against the defendants
Heber Bennion, Jr. and Yera ,V. Bennion, his wife.
The Court ruled that an enforceable contract existed
between the parties and that an Earnest Money Receipt
and Offer to Purchase, dated August 12, 1964, which
constituted the only written evidence of the alleged
contract, was "plain and certain" in meaning, leaving
"no uncertainty, no indefiniteness (and) no ambiguity"
as to its terms, thereby entitling plaintiff to an enforce·
ment of those terms as a matter of law.
Thereafter, on September 8, 1965, following a
further hearing, the Court granted Summary Judg·
ment against the defendant, Bennion Ranching Com·
pany, holding it bound by the same contract and to
the same extent as the individual defendants.
An appeal was taken from each of the summary
judgments, the first, involving the individual defe~d
ants, being Case No. 10393, and the second, involvmg
the corporate defendant, being Case No. 10482.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendants seek a reversa l of t lle sum1narv. J. uda·
I"
.
.
h
tl
11
ed
contract
ment and a rulmg bv this Court t at le a eg
.
.
I~
ti
lternatnc.
is a matter of law unenforceable. n 1e a

2

defewlants seek a reversal of the summary judgment
11 ith diredions to give defendants a full trial as to all
of the issues presented.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
It is well established that in Utah, as elsewhere,
courts should be reluctant to invoke the drastic remedy
of a summary judgment, since it prevents a litigant
from fully presenting his case to the courts. Brandt
i:. Sprinyville Banking Co., 10 U2d 350, 353 P2d
~60 ( 1960). Only where the pleadings, evidence, admissions, and inferences therefrom, when viewed most
favorably to the losing party, show clearly that there
remains no genuine issue as to any material fact, and
that the winner is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law, it is proper to grant a summary judgment. Such
a showing must preclude, as a matter of law, all reasonable possibility that the loser could win if given a trial.
Frederick May & Co. v. Dunn, 13 U 2d 40, 368 P 2d
266, (1962). On appeal from a summary judgment
this Court is obliged to consider the evidence and all
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the losing party. Whitman v. W. T. Grant Co.,
16 U2d 81, 395 P2d 918 ( 1964).

Thus, the defendants, having suffered the entry
of summary judgments aginst them, and having been
wholly <lepriYed of their right to present their case or
any part of it to the lower court, are entitled to have
their po.'iition considered on this appeal in a manner

3

.,
consistent
with the foregoing rules·, that. is· t o say m
.
.
the light most favorable to them.
·'
In this brief, the parties are referred to as thei·
appeared in the trial court. All references to the recor;l
are to the red page numbers. The typed page numbers
are ignored.

STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
For more than forty-five ( 45) years, the defendants, Heber Bennion, Jr., age 77, and Yera \V. Bennion,
his wife, age 73, have owned and operated a ranch and
livestock business in Daggett County, near Manila,
G tab. ( R. 138). During those many years up to August,
1964, they were able, through hard work, careful management and thrift to build up and expand their properties and operations so that they included approximately 900 acres of irrigated crop lands having a market
value of approximately $200.00 per acre, and approximately 1180 acres of uncultivated grazing or range
lands having a market value of approximately $50.00
per acre. (R. 66, 187). All of the lands except one
tract known as Henry's Fork, located in Sweetw~t~r
County,
yoming, and consisting of 200 acres of irri·
gated land and 120 acres of unirrigated land, are ~lose~y
adjoined. Also included among these properties, Ht
·
l 1675 head of sheep.
August, 1964, were approximate y
and 218 head of cattle, ( R. 184) having a value '.n
.
· ·1 ges worth III
excess of $50,000.00, and grazmg pr1v1 e
excess of $5,000.00. ( R. 192).

"r
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D11e to health problems experienced by Mrs.
Benniou iu recent years and the heavy demands of the
Hitire rnuching operation upon both of the Bennions
at their ad ranced age, they decided to sell a portion
nf their lands. ( R. 139). Accordingly they listed the
Henry's Fork property in \Vyoming for sale with
Phelp's Hcalty of .Midvale, Utah. (R. 63). At the
, suggestion of )Ir. Dan Brown, agent for Phelp's
Realty, the property was listed for sale at $42,500.00
(R. 63).

The plaintiff, Dudley l\I. Amoss, an active member
of the Ctah Bar since 1955, expressed interest in the
Bennion properties and conferences were had between
the Bennions and .Mr. Amoss, accompanied by 1.\fr.
Brown, ostensibly as the real estate agent. It later
dereloped, however, that Brown was a partner with
Amoss in the purchase from the Bennions. (R. 106).

1

The conferences culminated in the signing on
August 12, l!)GJ., of an Earnest l\Ioney Receipt and
Offer to Purchase, to formalize an agreement which
the Bennions expected would be drafted up in the form
of a detailed contract for sale of virtually the entire
Benu;un properties to Amoss.
In their initial negotiations, Amoss offered to pay
~JOO 000.00 for approximately 860 acres of the Bennion
iand.). (R. 140). IIowever, due to complications en'uuuterrd in attempting to divide the properties so as
111
pro\'1de suitable fence lines and access and irrigation
111
both the land to be sold and those to be retained, it
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was proposed. by Mr. ~ennion that .Mr. Amoss pur·
chase the entire Benmon ranches, reserving to the
Bennions a life estate in the five-acre tract upon which
their home is located. (R. 140, 141).
Inasmuch as the course of the discussions and
events which followed this proposal by l\lr. Bennion
to sell virtually the entire ranching properties are
essential to a proper construction of the terms used
in the Earnest J\loney Receipt and Offer to Purchase,
and to an understanding of the dispute between the
parties and the issues presented in this appeal, they
are set out below at some length.
At first Mr. Bennion offered to sell for $200,000.00
all of the real property, machinery and equipment and
water rights, excepting only the five-acre life estate
referred to above and sufficient irrigation and culinary
water for the life estate. (R. 141).
This offer contemplated that Bennion would either
pay off from his own funds a debt in the amount of
$49,000.00, owed on a Federal Land Bank mortgage.
or that a deduction would be made from the purchase
price of $200,000.00 to the extent of payments made
on the Federal Land Bank mortgage by Amoss. In
other words, Amoss would have an option to either
assume and pay this mortgage and deduct the payments
from the purchase price or let Bennion pay it and remain
liable for the full purchase price. (R. 141). 'fhe n~t
.
.
amount to be received
by t he B enmons,
un der tin'
ti Federnl
offer, after payment of the debt owe<l t o 1e
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Land ]fank, was to be $151,000.00. At this point there
had been no discussion as to possible sale of the livestock
or range rights, it being .Mr. Bennion's intention to
sell these separately on the open market, or to other
indiriduals. ( R. 141).
Mr. Amoss was agreeable to these terms and he,
assisted by Dan Brown, who had been present through
the discussions, commenced drawing up an Earnest
jfoney Receipt and Offer to Purchase, (R. 16). hereinafter called the Earnest Money Receipt. In filling
it out, however, several further problems arose which
required solution.
Amoss wanted all mineral rights to be conveyed

11ith the property. Bennion wanted to reserve these but
finally conceded and agreed to transfer the mineral
rights as a part of the sale. ( R. 64) . Amoss next wanted
Bennion to include the livestock, worth in excess of
$,j(),000.00, and the range rights which the Bennions
had purchased from a l\fr. Schofield.

1

Mr. Bennion promptly and emphatically advised
Amoss and Brown that neither the livestock nor range
rights would be included in the sale price of $200,000.00
which he had offered to accept. ( R. 141). He explained
that both represented a substantial equity in favor of
the Bennions over and above debts that were owed
against them. Amoss and Brown were informed that
there would be no sale unless this equity interest were
recognized and paid for by Amoss. Thus the parties
reached a11 impasse.

7

In further discussions, Bennion advised Amoss
that a sum of about $35,000.00 was owed under a livestock mortgage to Utah Farm Production Credit Association, hereinafter referred to as P .C .A., and that th~
further sum of $5,100.00 was owed to Schofiel1l on the
range rights. It was finally agreed tlia t i11 return for
the transfer of the livestock and range rights to Amos~,
the purchase price would be raised from $200,000.00
to $206,000.00, to compensate the Bennions for their
equity in the livestock and range rights. Amoss was to
pay from his own funds all sums owed to the P.C.A
and to Schofield, with no reduction from the purchase
price for such payments. (R. 143). By this means,
Ainoss would get the livestock and would obligate him·
self to pay for them a sum somewhat less than, but
approaching, their fair market value. The Hennions
would realize something on their equity in the livestock
and range rights.
In further discussions at the same time, the Bennions expressed their desire to retain ownership of a
sixty-acre tract, approximately forty acres of which
was irrigated land, located under a high ledge rim at
the southwest corner of their properties and known as
the Keel place. ( R. 146-147). .Alnoss was agreeable
to this on condition that the Bennions deduct the value
of this tract from the purchase price of $206,000.00 as
previously computed. (R. 147). To arrive at this valne.
. . t e d l an d were pnc
. ·ed '·it '$·'00.00
the forty acres o f. Irnga
per acr~ and the remaining twenty acres were pri~ed
1
at $50.00 per acre, for a total of $9,000.00. (R. Ui
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This figure, when subtracted from the price of $206,ooo.oo, left a sale price of $197,000.00, which was then

written into the Earnest .:Money Receipt. Thus, it was
agreed at that point, and all parties clearly understood,
that the net amount to be received by the Bennions,
:ifter payment of all debts owed the P .C.A., Schofield
and the Federal Land Bank, was to be approximately
$U8,000.00. (R. 66).
HaYiug thus apparently resolved the foregoing
problems by negotiation, Amoss and Brown completed
the Earnest l\loney Receipt, as it appears in Exhibit
D-6, and it was signed by Amoss as purchaser, by
Brown on behalf of Phelp's Realty and by the Bennions as sellers. The addition of the notarial seal and
jurat and the crossing out of the words "Phelp's
Realty'', as appears on Exhibit 1-P, occurred after the
Earnest Money Receipt was signed. (R. 280).

1

1

Before the document was signed by lVfr. Bennion,
for himself and on behalf of Bennion Ranching Company, a elosely held corporation in which title to some
of the properties were held, a long distance telephone
eall was placed to J. Lambert Gibson, attorney for
Bennion, and both Bennion and Amoss talked to him
about the proposed sale. And, though portions of the
Earnest Money Receipt, as prepared, were read to
jfr. Gibson, he was not advised as to the details of
the negotiations supposedly incorporated in part into
Earnt>st l\loney Receipt, or the values, prices or details
'f Jlarme11t which underlay the agreement. (Deposition
1

9

of J. Lambert Gibson, pp. 14-15; R. 193). His principal concern at that time was the tax consequences
to the Bennions of the proposed sale and he as~umed
that Amoss was to pay the debts to P.C.A., the Fetleral
Land Bank and Schofield from his own funds just
as he was to pay the real estate commission, which he
also agreed in precisely the same terms in the Earnest
l\Ioney Receipt to pay from his own funds, without
deduction from the purchase price. (Deposition of S.
Lambert Gibson, p. 15; R. 198). 'fhus, without at·
tempting, at that distance and with his limited know!·
edge of the terms involved, to pass upon the sufficiency
of the Earnest :Money Receipt to accurately reflect
the proposed agreement of the parties, l\Ir. Gibson
told the Bennions that if the instrument reflected their
agreement to go ahead and sign it. They then did so
with the understanding that a detailed, formal contract
of sale would be prepared by Amoss in which the many
obvious loose ends and details of the sale and purchase
would be spelled out. (R. 67, 182).
Either later that same day or the following day.
the Bennions noticed that Amoss or Brown, perhaps
intentionally, had left a slip of paper in the lleunion
home on which computations of the sale were listed.
(R. 179). They noticed that the figures apparent!)"
· 0 f the
reflected a deduction from the purchase pnee
amount of the Federal Land Bank mortgage. as agreed,
.
. was to b e pa1"d o ff b y A moss, an< l 1'11 '·iddition.
smce
it
.
. agreemen t , of the deLts
a deduction,
contrary to t h elf
owed to the P .C.A. and to Schofield.
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The possible implications of these computations
1 li~turbcd the Be11nions greatly inasmuch as the agreement oil this point had been so carefully worked out
and it 'ms so clearly understood that, although Amoss
11 as to assume and pay all of these obligations, he
\\'oulcl, nevertheless, be entitled to deduct from the
purdiase priee only the payments on the Federal Land
Bank mortgage. Yet the effect of a reduction in the
purdiase price of the additional sums owed to the
P.C.A. and Schofield would be to require the Bennions
to par off these debts from their own funds while at
tlw same time giving the livestock and range rights
to Amoss free and clear. Such an arrangement would
reduce Amoss' obligation to between $40,000.00 and
$.30.000.00 less than he had actually agreed to pay.
In order to resolve the question thus raised without
further lapse of time and to protect their rights in case
.imoss intended to claim the right to a deduction from
tlie purchase price for payments made to the P.C.A.
and to Schofield, contrary to their clear understanding
un that point, .l\Ir. Bennion contacted Mr. Gibson
either that same day or the following day. After explaining the background of the question thus raised,
lie instructed Gibson to find out from Amoss immediately what his position was so that action could be taken
\ at once should there be an issue on the point. ( R. 179).

1

\Vlien Gibson contacted Amoss within a day or
111 0 tliereafter and inquired as to his position, Amoss
ilatei] tltat he would "stand on the contract," and that

11

the payments to P.C.A. and Schofield woul<l be deducted from the purchase price. ( R. 199). Gibson then
told Amoss that this was not the agreement to whidi
the Bennions had assented and that in his opinion the
contract was ambiguous. He told Amoss explicitly
that if he insisted on that interpretation, there woul;l
be no sale. Amoss then replied that .Mr. Brown haJ
a complete set of notes he had taken during the negotiations and that he would, therefore, have Brown talk
to Gibson about it. (R. 199).
'Vhen Brown contacted Gibson shortly thereafter,
he agreed with Bennion that there was to be no deduction from the purchase price except to the extent of
payments made by Amoss on the Federal Land Bank
mortgage. (R. 116-117); Gibson Deposition, pp. 1617). The next day, Brown and Gibson went to the
Bennion ranch and advised the Bennions that such "·as
the understanding and the agreement. ( R. 200).
Having thus satisfied themselves that Amoss in·
tended to honor his agreement in this regard, the Ben·
nions and Gibson went ahead with the steps invo!Yed
in the sale. :Mr. Bennion had his abstracts brought up
to date and these were delivered to Amoss. (R. 182).
He assisted Amoss and Brown, who was then manag·
ing Amoss' interest in the properties, in every way .he
could to assure a smooth turn over of the properties
when the final contracts were drawn up by, nnd the
properties delivered to, Amoss. Throughout the con·
.
versations with Amoss, Benmon
repeate<II ~. rerp 1ested
·
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' that the c:losiug documents be completed and delivered
to him, awl Amoss always insisted that he would draw
them tl_lJ himself and present them to Bennion and
Gibson.
In a further meeting with Amoss and Brown at

l\moss · office in Salt Lake City, on September 14,
!96~, on matters relating to the sale, Amoss again told
Bennion and Gibson that he understood there would
be no deduction except as to payments under the
Federal Land Bank mortgage. ( R. 200).
With this understanding and based upon this reaffirmatiou of Bennion's position, possession of the
properties, including livestock, was turned over to
Amoss the following day.

1

Also, during the period up to October 10, 1964,
in repeated other contacts with Brown and Amoss,
Bennion was given to believe that there was no further
problem in this regard. The matter had been raised
tliredly with Amoss and he and Brown had agreed with
Hennion's position.
Not until a meeting in Amoss' office on October
10, 1964, did Amoss dispute that Bennion's position
iras correct. In that meeting he denied having conceded
the matter and reverted to his old position that he
110uld "stand on the contract," (R. 202) and insist
11
11 deducting the P .C.A. and Schofield payments. By
llii~ time, of course, Amoss had sold nearly all of the
r·~ttle and sheep ( R. 48, 49) and apparently felt he
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could force Bennion to abandon his claim to full pay.
ment. Bennion and Gibson walked out of Amoss' otfi~e
when he told them of his new position.
The following day, Amoss flew to Manila, Utah,
and in a conversation with Bennion and Gibson, and
with Brown present, agreed to compromise the dispute
and to add $17,500.00 to the purchase price. (R. 120).
Other details of the sale were discussed and agreed to
at the same time. Prior to this meeting Amoss also
claimed a right to $2,100.00 worth of stock which Ben·
nions owned in the P.C.A. although this had never been
discussed between them or mentioned in the Earnest
Money Receipt.
Approximately one week following this meeting,
which occurred at Bennion's home, Amoss forwarded
to Gibson, for execution by Bennion, an Assignment
of 800 irrigation shares (Exhibit 3D) , a Bill of Sale
(Exhibit 4D) and a Real Estate Mortgage (Exhibit
5D), apparently to close the sale under the newly
reached agreement. In reviewing the mortgage, Gibson
noticed the "release provisions" whereby Bennion would
agree that for each $200.00 paid by Amoss they w~ul~
release to Amoss at Amoss' selection, one acre of 1rri·
gated, cultivated land, or for each $50.00 paid, Ben·
nions would release one acre of unirrigated, uncuJtiyated
· I ded
land. Further, the proposed documents me u
about one-half of the land known as the Keel place
which the parties had agreed the Bennions could.reserve
at the southwest corner of their ranch properties.

14

j

I

There had been no previous discussion as to release
prorisious as thus prepared, and the proposed instruments clearly violated the previous agreement that
Bennion would retain all of the land known as the Keel
place below the ledge rather than just half of it. The
release provisions as framed by Amoss were particularly
intolerable to Bennion ( R. 196) since it would permit
Amoss to pick up the land in a checkerboard pattern
so as to destroy for all practical purposes the value
of the remaining land and thus render valueless the
only security which the Bennions were retaining.
This attempt by Amoss to again completely rewrite the agreement to his own advantage in violation
of the prior understandings, coming as it did after his
duplicitous conduct in agreeing to, then denying, Bennions' right to the full purchase price reduced only
by the amount of the .Federal Land Bank mortgage
payments, and his failure to provide the closing contract and documents which he had insisted on doing
himself, and which Bennion had repeatedly requested
that he furnish, made it impossible for Bennion to stand
still any longer. By this time, most of his livestock had
been sold hy Amoss, who refused to keep Bennion
adrised as to the sales or account for the proceeds as
he had agreed. He had repeatedly repudiated his own
agreenwnts and the understandings he had reached
11 ith Bennion and Gibson. He had forced the Bennions
t1Jto a drastic compromise of their rights under threat
11
f litigation. Further even, to the present date, Amoss
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hasn't paid a single dollar to the Bennions toward the
purchase price of the property as agreed.
Thus, it became painfully apparent, more than
two months after the Earnest l\!Ioney Receipt was
signed, that Amoss intended to renege on this agreement where it was to his advantage to do so and to
rely upon legal technicalities. Without legal training,
Bennion could not expect to meet him any longer on
even terms. Accordingly, on advice of his counsel,
Bennion told Brown and Amoss to cease exercising
dominion over his lands and those of his livestock that
remained, until such time as the matter could finally
be settled. This suit was filed within a few days thereafter.
It will readily be noted from the Earnest .Money
Receipt (R. 16) that it provides for a deposit of $500.00
and an initial payment of $14,500.00 to have been paid
on September 1, 1964, the date of delivery of possession
to Amoss. As noted above, however, not a dollar of
these amounts has been paid to Bennions. Although
Exhibit "A" in. the Earnest Money Receipt refers
to the reservation of a five-acre life estate there is no
description of the boundaries of the land to be included.
The document refers to an "Exhibit C", Inventory of
Personal Property included in the sale, attached, yet
· rono such inventory has ever been prepared. I t is P
vided that the balance of the purchase price is to be
paid in 15 "equal annual payments" but the a~ount
of the balance to be paid was omitted, perhaps inten-
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tioually, by Amoss and Brown. No provision is made
for date or place of payment or who is to receive them.
The Earnest .l\Ioney Receipt provides that the
"buyer (is) to assume Federal Land Bank Loan,
P.C.A. livestock loan and R. Schofield range contract
and that "Buyer assumes entire commission." And
while Amoss claims that he can deduct payments to the
P.C.A. and Schofield, he admits, nevertheless, that the
real estate commission which he also "assumes" under
the contract was to be paid from his own funds without
the right to a deduction. (R. 106, 107).
Although Amoss readily admits that reservation
of the Keel place to Bennion ( R. 89) was a part of
the agreement, the Earnest Money Receipt contains
not a single word in that regard. Nor does it mention
the shares of irrigation water which Bennion reserved
for use 011 the Keel place, though that was similarly
a part of the agreement. It was because of the need
to tie down the many details of the sale, of which the
foregoing are but examples, that the parties contemplated the preparation of a detailed contract of sale
by Amoss for approval by the Bennions.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE LO,VER COURT ERRED IN RULING
TfL\'l' THE CONTRACT lVAS ENFORCEABLE AS A l\IATTER OF LAW.
17

To begin with, it is well established in Ctah that
a contract is to be construed strictly agai11st a partr
who prepares or furnishes it. It has been speciticall;·
recognized that in Utah this rule is particular!~· appli~.
able where, as here, the party furnishing and preparing
the contract is an attorney. Maw v. Noble, 10 T:tah
2d 440, 354 P 2d 121 (1960); Andreasen v. Hansen,
8 Utah 2d 370, 335 P2d 404 ( 1959). The salutary
effect of this rule is to require one who is trained a11 ;l
knowledgeable in legal rules and technicalities to con·
duct his dealings with a layman in an open, frank and
forthright manner. Any other rule would leave the
layman, as a practical matter, at the mercy of the
superior legal knowledge of the attorney, as this case
readily demonstrates.
It has likewise been recognized by this Court that
a fiduciary realtionship exists between a real estate
agent and his client and it is incumbent upon the agent
to honestly and fairly represent the interests of those
who engage his services under penalty of rerocation
of his license. Reese v. Harper, 8 Utah 2<l 119, 329
P 2d 410 ( 1958) ; Reich v. Clzristupulos, 123 f'tah
137, 256 P 2d 238 (1953); Section 61-~-11. U.C.A
1953. lie must apply his abilities and knowledge to
the advantage of the man he serves; and make full
111
disclosure of all facts which his client should know
.
.
R eese v. H arper. su pra '. Reich
transactmg
the b usmess.
·
v. Christopulos. supra.
A pp lying the foregoing rules to the present easel
it will be noted that Amoss has been a pradicing nnr
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adire member of the Utah Bar since 1955.

Brown
acted as real estate agent for the realty firm which
had been highly recommended to Bennion for reliability
aud inkgrity. Both of them are young, active and alert.
The Beunions, on the other hand, though well educated
and suceessful ranchers, had only a meager knowledge
of real estate transactions and no legal or commercial
training as such. At their advanced ages, and looking
forward to a eomfortable retirement, they were in no
position either by experience, training or inclination
to match wits with Amoss and Brown.
Thus, in the present case, where the contract was
furnished and prepared by Amoss, assisted by Brown,
ostensibly as a real estate agent, but in fact the undisclosed partner of Amoss to this purchase, it becomes
doubly imperative that the rule of strict construction
be carefully observed to prevent the type of overreaching which oecurred here.
In view of the foregoing rules governing con1lructio11 of' contracts, and this Court's pronouncements
gorerning the granting of summary judgment, it seems
incredible that the defendants could have been prel'iuded, as a matter of law, from challenging the force
and effect of the alleged contract, and that they could
have been deprived of their right to fully present their
('ase to the court, as they were prepared to do. Such
a disposition of this case is wholly unsupportable for
a number of reasons as outlined below, each of which
alu1w re(p1ires a reversal of the summary judgment of
dir l .nwer Court.
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In ~~der to be enforceable by court proeeedingb
for specific performance, a contract for sale or conveyance of real property must be definite, certain and
unambiguous in its essential and material terms, -HI
Am. Jur. 2d 36 (Specfic Performance, Seetion 2:!), and
it must express each material term in a reasonabl\'
definite manner. Bruggeman v. Sokol, (Calif. n.c:.
1954) 265 P2d 57 5. The contract is sufficiently definite
if, and only if, the obligations of each of the parties
can be determined from the instrument without aid
of parol evidence as to the parties' intentions. 81 C.J.S.
487 (Specific Performance, Section 316). A greater
degree of certainty, moreover, is required in a suit for
specific performance than in an action for damages.
81 C.J.S. 483 (Specific Performance, Section 31).
Applying these principles, the courts haYe held
contracts such as the one involved in the present case
to be, as a matter of law, unenforceable on the ground
they were too ambiguous, indefinite and uncertain. Thus
in Hubbell v. Ward, ('Vash. 1952), 246 P2d 468, the
court overruled a decree of the trial court w hieh directed
the defendant "to enter into a real estate contract ac·
cording to the terms on an Earnest .Money Receipt
and agreement" for purchase of an apartment house.
The Earnest :Money Receipt in that case contained a
provision by which the purchaser agreed to pay n dowH
pavment and "sign a contract for the balanee, payable
. lm1mg
· m
. t eres t '·1I the
at •$200.00 or more per mont 1l, me
rate of 5% on deferred balances." The eourt uotfd
that "real estate purchase contracts differ iu tlteir prn
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n., 10m depending upon the nature of the property
inro!Yed and the individual requirements of the parties."
Further, the agreement contemplated that a real estate
wntract would be drawn in the future which would
contain "new and additional provisions not mentioned
m the agreement." Due to the uncertainty and indefii' niteness thus created by the agreement, the court held
' that the contract could not be specifically enforced as
the plaintiffs contended and as the trial court had
directed.
The court noted that numerous important matters
i 11ere left undecided by the parties, including such
matters as forfeiture rights and procedures, right to
hquidated damages for breach, extent of insurance to
be carried, by whom and for whose benefit, right to
make capital improvements with or without permission
of the seller, protection against mechanic and materialmeu's liens suffered by the parties, right to remove
personal property without seller's permission, rights
of buyer as to the use of the property, when and where
nwuthly payments were to be made by the purchaser,
responsibility for injury to third persons on the premises. The court noted at page 471 of its opinion:
''Respondents have not indicated in their
brief whether the 'usual and standard' real estate
purehase contract includes any provisions relatiYe to the matters mentioned above. They argue
that it is not necessary for the earnest money
agreement to contain a ·forfeiture clause, a desigua tiou of the place of payment, any provision
a-, to who shall bear the risk of loss during the
21

life ?f the contract, or any provision relative to
fire msurance. It may be true that such matter·
are not ordinarily provided for in an earnes~
money agreement, but respondents recognize
that the contemplated real estate contract is to
contain some new and additional provisions not
mentioned in the agreement."
After reviewing previous similar cases, the court concluded at page 472:
"We conclude that the agreement here, in so
far as it looks to the preparation and execution
of a future real estate purchase contract upon
which the minds of the parties have not met, is
not sufficiently definite and certain and cannot
be specifically enforced."
The present case presents even more compelling
reasons for denying specific performance than did the
Hubbell case, supra. The total amount involved in that
sale was $29,000.00 and it included only an apartment
building and personal property contained therein.
Further, it involved a deposit of $500.00 and a down
payment of $9,000.00 which together, accounted nearly
one-third of the total purchase price. By contrast, the
Earnest Money Receipt in the present case involves
a wide range of properties worth over $270,000.00,
including real and personal properties, including ma·
chinery and equipment and water rights worth at least
$206,000.00, livestock worth $50,000.00 to $60,000.00
and range rights worth at least $5,100.00. 'fhese
values are more than nine times greater than those
involved in Hubbell, snpra, yet it calls for the same
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deposit of only $500.00 and a down payment of $14,500.00 which together amount to only one-eighteenth
of the total purchase price. The agreement was further
complicated moreover by reservation to the Bennions
of a life estate in five acres and title to sixty additional
acres and sufficient irrigation and culinary water to be
used on them.
These comparisons are especially significant when
one considers that the importance and the number of
matters which must be provided for and agreed upon
in a sale such as is involved here depend directly upon
the value and nature of the properties involved. Thus
it is only to be expected that a single sale involving
greater values and a wider range of different properties
will require greater detail as to agreement than one
inrolYing less value and less complex properties. Having this in mind, it is important to note that a single
sheet of pa per, prepared by Amoss, on a form not
particularly suitable for sales of the type involved here,
constitutes the entire written evidence of the proposed
sale. And it is not only fatally lacking in important
details of the agreement, upon which the parties never
reached agreement, but fails entirely to even mention
matters which even Amoss concedes were essential parts
of the agreement that was reached.
This Court has held that an Earnest Money Receipt
and offer to purchase may constitute a binding contract,
11 hich defelldants readily concede, but it has stated that
an enforceable contract will not be found to exist unless
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the requisite standards of certainty and definiteness
are met. Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P2d 597
( 1962) ; Reich v. Christopulos, 123 Utah 137, 256 P2d
238 (1953). It is submitted that it would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, for one of the parties to
draw up a binding contract on a single page Earnest
Money Receipt form under the facts and complexities
involved in this case, and in view of the value and nature
of the properties to be used. Indeed, even a disinterested and skilled third party would have to exercise
great care in order to draft a binding contract on such
a form for sale of these properties under these circurn·
stances. If the rule were otherwise, the courts would be
compelled to write the contract for the parties which
they are not in a position to do.
In the Bunnell case, supra, this Court rejected the
claim of a seller of real property that an Earnest Money
Receipt signed by him was too indefinite and uncertain
to be enforceable where it required the purchaser to
convey by a Uniform Real Estate Contract, as a part
of her down payment for the property being purchased,
other property owned by the purchaser. This Court
there found a complete lack of substance in claims
by the seller that a failure to specify interest, where
none was to be charged, and "price and terms" for the
.t
trade-in property, where the Earnest .Money Rec~Ip
specifically provided a price of $15,000.00 and the time
the conveyance was to be made. There the purehaser·
had been willing to complete the sale and convey the
trade-in property but the seller had sold his real prop·
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I

crty to a third party on more favorable terms than
those agreed upon with the original purchaser. This
Court there found the seller's claims as to unenforceability to be "nothing more than an attempt to evade
the obligations of a valid contract."

The 1l cese case, supra, was a suit to recover a
broker's commission as to a proposed sale which was
nerer consummated, due to a dispute between the buyer
and seller, as in the present case, over the construction
of the terms used in the Earnest Money Receipt. So
the issue as to what certainty is required to make a
binding contract was not reached. This Court there,
howe,·er, set forth the standards of conduct which a
seller can expect of his real estate agent in terms particularly applicable to the facts of the present case as
follows:
".Mr. Reese further avers that as between him
and Harper, their dealings were at arm's length;
that he was under no particular duty to coddle
and 'spoonfeed' Harper; that inasmuch as the
latter had ample opportunity to read the Receipt
and thereafter voluntarily signed it, he is precluded from questioning its contents and is bound
by it."
"The above contention is sound as between
people dealing with each other under usual circumstances. But the relationship of real estate
agent and client makes the situation quite different. The agent is issued a license and permitted
to hold himself 0~1t to the public as qualified by
training and experience to render a specialized
service in the field of real estate transactions.
25
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There rests U_POn him the r.esponsibility of hori
estly and fairly representmg the interests of
those wh~ e~gage his services, and upon failing
to do so his license may be revoked. Accordingly
persons who entrust their business to such agent;
are entitled to repose some degree of confidence
that they will be loyal to such trust and that
th~y will, with reason~ble diligence and in good
faith, represent the mterests of their clients.
Unless the law demands this standard, instead
of being the badge of competence and integrity
it is supposed to be, the license would serve onlr
as a foil to lure the unsuspecting public in t;i
be duped by people more skilled and experi·
enced in such affairs than are they, when they
would be better off taking care of such busines~
for themselves."
"Because of the specilized service the real es·
tate broker offers in acting as an agent for his
client there arises a fiduciary relationship be·
tween them; it is incumbent upon him to apply
his abilities and knowledge to the advantage of
the man he serves; and to make full disclosu~e
of all facts which his principal should know m
transacting the business."

"It is pertinent to observe that the. broker

Reese had Mr. Harper at even more d1sad;;~·
tage than might normally be expected. . e
wide difference in experience and . busmess
· b ·
an un·
acumen resulting in the parties emg. m 1. 11
· ·
th 1ngs w11c
. 1
equal position for bargammg are
the court and jury were entitled to ta~e JIJ ~
111
consideration in determining the matters con
·as
a farmer.
tention between them. M r. H arper ~
11ard
obviously inexperienced in business; "ff~as 11 . in
of hearing and therefore had some di icu ~
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eon versing with others; and in addition thereto
the court made an express finding indicating
that he was somewhat inept and lacking in
acumen with respect to business affairs."
ln this same connection, the standard of conduct
to which an attorney is held in dealing on his own behalf
with lay persons, and the effect of overreaching on his
part is referred to in Andreasen v. Hansen, 8 Utah 2d
370, 335 P2d 404 ( 1959) .
The Reich case, supra, also involved a suit on an
Earnest Money Receipt and a claim by the real estate
agent to a commission on the sale involved in the action.
On appeal the only issue was the agent's right to the
commission, but this Court in its opinion noted that
"the earnest money receipt here was only preliminary;
it looked toward the execution of a uniform real estate
contract," and that the purchaser was, therefore, free
to back out of the agreement to sell until the uniform
real state contract had been entered into.

In Bruygernan v. Sokol, (Calif. D. C. 1954), 265
P2d 575, an escrow agreement was held unenforceable
on the grounds, among others, that the form of the
instruments of conveyance, the time of payment of
interest and the terms of all encumbrances to represent
the payment were uncertain and indefinite.

In Bentzen v. N.H. Ranch, Inc., (Wyo., 1958),

B2o P2d 440, an "agreement

for Warranty Deed"
whieli resembled somewhat in appearance the Earnest
Jloney Receipt inYolved in the present case, was held
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to be unenforceable where it provided that for "balance
payable by future agreement on or before January I.
1954." The court there stated at page 444:
· .
"Defendants ... seem to adopt the view that
the matter of payment was a mere detail. ... we
do not deem this so; and the question of the
method of making deferred payments seems to
be even more compelling in sizeable transactions
wherein the method of amortization, the time
to be consumed therebv and the interest to be
paid, are, from a pra~tical standpoint, important and often controlling features."
For a collection of cases in which the terms goyerning the manner and time of payment of the price agreed
upon have been regarded as of sufficient importance
to warrant denial of specific performance unless set
forth with certainty, see Annotation, 68 A.L.R. 2d 1221,
Section 2 at page 1222. See, for example, Roberts v.
Adams, (Calif. D.C., 1958), 330 P2d 900, in which the
lessee under a lease-purchase option agreed to pay a
total sum of $85,000.00 "payable as mutually agreeable by both parties." The court there held that the
"failure to specify or furnish a standard for determination of terms of payment and method of securing
the unpaid balance of the purchase price of real or ot~1er
property is fatal to its enforceability notwithstandmg
any desire of the courts to be liberal and helpful.''
In Bryant v. Clark', (Tex. App. 1961), 347 SW
.
.
f $10 Q(l0.00
2d 635, the contract provided for a price o • '
"fift en annual
with a down payment of $
, 2,000.00 an d
e '
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mstallmcnts as balance." The court denied specific
performance on the ground that neither the time nor
conditions of the annual installments were fixed.
In Reeves v. Littlefield, (Mont. 1936), 54 P2d
879, the contract provided a price of $900.00, of which
$100.00 was to be a down payment, balance at $20.00
per month with 6% interest. The purchaser offeror
requested that the seller have her attorney draw up a
contract. In concluding that the contract was unenforceable the court noted at page 880 that

"No mention was made as to whether the
property was conveyed by deed and a mortgage
given as security for the deferred payments,
or a contract retaining title in the vendor, or a
conveyance of the property outright with no
security ... nothing was said as to the remedies
available in the event of default in payment by
the purchaser . . . no time was specified when
the interest shall be payable, whether annually,
monthly or after all of the payments on the
principal had been made. No place of payment
is suggested in any of the correspondence. It
is man ifest from the correspondence that the
parties contemplated the making of a future
contract which. doubtless, would include many
provisions relating to the subjects which we have
suggested, about which the correspondence was
altogether silent."
That tlie Earnest Money Receipt in the present
case is fatallv uncertain and deficient in a multitude
11
f particular~ is readily apparent, not only from the
repented disputes over a two-month period as to numer29

ous essential matters between Bennion and Amoss, but
from a review of the terms contained in the document
itself. That it is fatally uncertain and deficient is also
apparent from the fact that it makes no mention of
the Keel property or irrigation rights therefor although
Amoss agrees that was an essential part of the whole
transaction.
The inventory of personal property which was to
have been attached to the document as Exhibit "C" was
never even prepared.
The document provides, at line 14, for payment of
"$1.t.,000.00 Fourteen Thous Five Hund on

delivery of deed or final contract of sale which
shall be on or before Sept. l, 1964 and $.......... .
each year commencing l year from date of closing payble in 15 equal annual payments. Buyer
to assume Federal Land Bank Loan, P.C.A
Livestock Loan & R. Schofield Range contract
until the balance of $-------------------- together witl1
interest is paid."
At line 27 it further provides that
"Contract of Sale or Instrument of conveyance to be made in the name of Dudley M
Amoss."
And at line 33, in fine print,

"It is understood that the terms writt~n

ID

this receipt constitute the entire preli!11H~~ry
contract between the purchaser and the se 011ei_.
and that no verbal statement made liy rznY '
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relative to this transaction shall be construed to
be a part of this transaction unless incorporated
in writing herein. It is further agreed that execution of the final contract shall abrogate this
Earnest .Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase."
( ~~mphasis added).
There can be no doubt from the quoted excerpts
that a formal contract of sale was to have been prepared to implement the sale and spell out the details.
This was to have been done by Amoss, who insisted that
he be permitted to draft it, presumably so he could make
it the way he wanted it. Yet it having been agreed
that he could do it, and knowing the importance to
himself and to Bennion of getting the many essential
details down in written form so they could be reviewed
and agreed upon, he let the matter drift along, perhaps
purposefully, heedless of Bennions' repeated inquiry
as to when they could be expected.
This conduct becomes all the more censurable
when considered in the light of the repeated serious
disputes during that period as to the meaning of the
Earnest .Money Receipt and what had been agreed
upon. Amoss was told within a day or two after the
document was signed that Bennion violently denied
his right to deduct the P.C.A. and Schofield debts, and
then himself orally agreed with Bennions' position
both on his own behalf and through his partner, Brown.
It was, therefore, all the more incumbent upon him
lo get the matter resolved by a formal contract of sale,
~ 1 he had agreed to do, rather than do nothing and
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hope that l\Ir. Bennion would trip upon legal technicalities and lose his rights by default.
Yet, after two months of anxious waiting by the
Bennions for the contract to be furnished by Amoss, and
Amoss, by then having himself sold most of the Bennion
livestock, he apparently decided that he was in a sufficiently strong position to force Bennions' submission.
So he suddenly changed his position and boldly announced, in the time-worn phrase used by those who
intend to hide behind legal technicalities, that he would
"stand on that contract."
Needless to say, had the contract of sale been prepared in good faith in advance of the September l,
1964, closing date as contemplated it is probable that
all terms could have been amicably agreed upon and
the sale completed. But Amoss now seeks to take
advantage of the situation created by his own failure.
perhaps intentional, to perform as agreed. The matter
of the deduction and other problems having been spe·
cifically and directly raised with Amoss and Brown.
and the Bennions having thereafter delivered their lands
and livestock to Amoss and attempted in every possible
way to assist Amoss in reliance upon the concession by
Amoss and Brown that the Bennion position was car·
rect, it is shocking that he would then seek claim by the
advantage of his own duplicity. And having repeatedly
given Bennion to believe that the contract would .be
furnished, Amoss should not now be permitted to clauu
that it was not required. The need for a detailed con·
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tract was apparent from the very beginning, even to
Bennion, who lacks legal training. That it was needed
is also amply borne out by the present status of affairs
between Bennion and Amoss. Not only were numerous
material and important matters left for agreement
between the parties, but the terms of the Earnest Money
Receipt, even as drawn, are unclear and uncertain.
The following material and important questions, by
\\'ay of example, were left to be agreed upon or uncertain under the Earnest Money Receipt as drawn,
many of which were never even discussed between the
parties at any time and many of which refer to matters
which are discussed in the cases cited above.
1. Although defendants conceded that

a sufficiently definite understanding was had as to the
overall lands to be conveyed, being virtually all
of the Bennion Ranches, what is the description
of the five-acre life estate which was reserved?
"That is the amount of the irrigation and culinary
water to be furnished and at what times and upon
what conditions was it to be furnished? What
charges, if any, might be made against the water
thus reserved? For how long a period was the water
reserved? \Vas the life estate reserved for the life
of Mr. Bennion, Mrs. Bennion, the survivor of
them or the corporation? Were the water rights
reserved for a similar period or was outright ownership reserved?
'2. 'Vhat is the acreage
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and description of the

Keel place, which although it had been resene<l
prior to the signing of the document, is not mn
mentioned therein~ Bennion says it was sixty acres.
with corresponding water rights, as would be e~
pected. Amoss says it was forty acres and without
any water rights, which would be absurd. \Yas it
to be pie-shaped as the proposed mortgage dra11 11
by Amoss would indicate, or following the some·
what irregular ledge along the north side as Ben·
nion says? How can the inclusion of the Keel prop- '
erty as an essential part of the whole sale be reconciled with the recital in the agreement that it con·
tained the entire contract between the parties and
that no verbal understandings could be considered!
Could the water rights be sold without the sellers'
permission? 'Vere they to be included under the
mortgage?
3. 'Vhat items of personal property were included
in the sale? A list was never prepared to he at·
tached as the document indicates. \Vere the ma·
chinery, equipment and other items of personal
property to be included in the mortgage! CoulJ
they be sold or replaced without the sellers' per·
mission? Would later-acquired or replacement
property and livestock be included under the mort·
gage? Upon sale of the livestock by Amoss. what
obligation did he have as to accounting for and
. . o f t l1e procee d s o f sa1e so as t <> protetl
apphcat10n
,
llennion's security interest in the cattle! \\ :i'
.
1 l rf nrr Jier1I
Amoss to be reqrnred to keep up t le Jree 1 I"'
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as to number and quality of sheep and cattle, or
could he sell them as he pleased and leave the ranch
without cattle to run on it? Could Amoss sell off
the cattle without restriction, as he claims, leaving
Hennion accountable to the P.C.A. and in breach
of his loan agreement with them? These matters
are of utmost importance to a ranching operation.
4. Since Amoss admits that he was to pay from

his own funds, without the right of deduction,
the real estate commission which he "assumes"
under the agreement, what portion, if any, of the
payments to Federal Land Bank, P.C.A. and
Schofield, which he also agreed to "assume," would
he be obliged to pay from his own funds without
the right of deduction from the purchase price?
In other words, does the contract mean Amoss is
to pay the purchase price plus the loans, or the
purchase price minus the loans? Or does it mean
simply, as they agreed and as Bennion understood,
that Amoss would be responsible for seeing that
they were paid and that the right to a deduction
from the purchase price would be governed by
their further understanding in that regard that
only the Federal Land Bank debt would be deducted? If, as Amoss claims, all of the debts listed
on lines 17 and 18 were to be treated the same,
why should he be permitted a deduction as to any
of them, since he admits there was to be none for
the real estate commission? ( R. 272) .
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5. 'Vlrnt is the unpaid balance and the amount
of monthly payments which are left blank on line~
14 and 19 of the Earnest JHoney lleceipt! () 11
what day of the year does each payment fall due~
Since the first payment is due "one year from <late
of closing," are the payments due at );early inter·
vals from the "date of closing" in the instrument,
which is September l, 1964, or does it mean the
actual date of closing, which as yet has not oc·
curred? 'Vhere and to whom are the payments tu
be made? "That remedies do the sellers have in case
of buyer's default? This is very important here
where the down payment is so minimal. Wheu.
where and to whom is interest to be paid? Is it
to be paid from the first or the last payments or
spread evenly over the entire contract? How is
interest to be computed in case of default?

6. 'Vhat instruments are to secure the obligations'.
Is it to be a deed and mortgage back or an escrmr
agreement or a contract of sale or some other in·
strument? "That property is to be included under
the mortgage ?-The realty, the water stock, the
livestock, the equipment, the personal property,
es1
or Amoss' Greathouse ranch? Can se 11ers ass"
late charges? Can the purchaser make prepay-

ments, and if so, on what terms?
7. 'Vhere is the closing to take place? How .much
· b uyer t o ma intau1
fire and other insurance is
' · on
. agamst
.
. k·s aml for wh'''r
what properties,
w Imt ns
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benefit?
waste?

\Vhat are sellers' remedies m case of

Does the buyer have a right to assign his interest { If so, under what conditions? These matters
are particularly important where, as here, the down
payment amounts to less than 6% of the purchase
price.

8.

9.\Vhat form is the contract of sale to take? Whose
interpretation is to govern on disputes as to interpretation of the Earnest Money Receipt? As to
matters not mentioned? As to matters never discussed? As to matters not even thought of? The
whole reason behind the contemplated contract
of sale was to get all of the above matters down
in written, definite and binding form. The need
for such a contract is obvious.
The numerous important issues noted above must
be compared with those left open in Williams v. Manchester Bldg. Supply Co., (Ga., 1957), 97 SE2d 129,
in which the seller conveyed property, reserving "the
home house where he lived together with fifty acres
lying east and fifty acres lying west." A decree of specific performance was reversed on the ground of vagueness and uncertainty even though all of the reserved
lands were mentioned in the contract. The facts in that
case and the issues between the parties are strikingly
similar to those involved in the present case.
The Earnest l\f oney receipt is unenforceable for
)'et another and separate reason. Although it recites
37

that a deposit of $500.00 was made to bind the agreement, not a single penny has ever been paid to the
sellers. An<l, although Amoss now claims to hare paid
$500.00 to his partner Brown, there is no claim that r
was ever delivered to Bennion. Rather, the only par
ments by Amoss to anyone were payments 0 11 the
P.C.A. loan of a portion of the moneys he receired
upon sale of Bennion's livestock. He hasn't pai<l a
single penny out of his own pocket but rather, ha)
retained a substantial portion of the proceeds from the
sale of the livestock for himself.
1

Having failed to pay the agreed consideration.
the contract is not enforceable. As is stated in 17 Am.
J ur. 2d 433 (Contracts, Section 90) :
"A mere recital of receipt of consideration in
a simple written contract does not preclude proof
that the consideration was never paid, even for
the purpose of preventing the contract from lwr·
ing legal operation. The true rule appe~rs to h;
that recitals of consideration, unless mtenrleo
themselves to embody a contractual right or
obligation, may be contradicted, inasm\1ch as
the consideration of a written instrument is gen·
erally open to inquiry." (Emphasis added).
To the same effect are l Corbin on Contracts 559, Sec·
tion 130; 17 C.J.S. 756 (Contracts, Section 73).
Even if Amoss paid $500.00 to Brown as he IW''
.
.
claims, such would not constitute
paymen t t ° Benn1011
where it was never delivered to him and Brown wai
Amoss' partner. Rat 11er sue 1l a paymen t hr. Aninss
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1
\\llltld ha,·e the legal effect of a payment to himself,
This failure of
1t having been retained by Brown.
cousiueration, of course, entitles defendants to rescind
the contract. 17 A C.J .S. 515 (Contracts, Section 420).
Even if, as Amoss claims, the contract were determined to support his position as to his right to
deductions, it would be an error for the lower court
. to rule as a matter of law that it was not subject to
' ehallenge. Rather, the defendants should be permitted
to show that by Amoss' conduct and their reliance
thereon, tu their detriment, he is estopped under all
of the circumstances to now deny the correctness of
their position on deductions. The matter was raised
with him directly and he agreed with Bennion's position, both personally and through his partner, Brown.
He then permitted the Bennions rely upon that representation and that belief for a period of two crucial
months, during which time the Bennions changed their
position in reliance upon his acquiescence, assisting him
in every possible way by taking care of the livestock
and the lands, irrigating and harvesting crops, delivering to him their lands and livestock, permitting him
to sell the livestock without holding him to a strict
accountiug of numbers and proceeds as agreed, and
foregoing their right to have the matter determined
in a court at that point. Then he reneged on his prior
concurrence with their position and claimed the right
tu lllake deductions. Thus, even if the Bennions were
neting under a misconstruction of the contract, which
they s1 rnngl~· deny, by permitting them to so act to
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their detriment, Amoss became bound by that miscou
st~uction. Letta v. Cincinnati Iron & Steel Co., (otli
Cir. 1922), 285 Fe<l. 707; TVillard H elburn, Jnc. ;
Spiewak. (2nd Cir. 1950), 180 F2d 480; 17 Am .Jur
344 (Contracts, Section 9). Cf Carey v. U.S., (Ct. Cl.,
1960), 276 F2d 385; Caldwell v. Anschutz Drilling Co.,
13 Utah 2d 177, 369 P2<l 964 ( 1962) ; Sprague v.
Boyles Bros. Drilling Co., 4 Utah 2d 344, 294 P2d
689 ( 1956) ; Larsen v. Knight, 120 Utah 261, 233 P2d
365 ( 1951). And that the withholding of filing a suit
to determine contract rights will invoke this principle.
see Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. H. W. Nelson Co.,
(6th Cir. 1941), 116 F2d 823.
The present proceeding being an equity action,
moreover, requires that Amoss come into Court with
clean hands. The foregoing conduct precludes him from
attaining that requisite status in these proceedings.
Another separate ground why the contract, eren
if otherwise valid, should not have been held enforce·
able as a matter of law, is that of mistake, for which
reformation or rescission of the contract may be granted.
Thus it is stated in Sine v. Harper, U8 Utah 415, 222
P 2d 571 (1950), that ...
" ... the power of the Court to rectify mu~ual
mistake implies that this power may be exercis~d
notwithstanding that the true agreem~1:t of~ 1e
in writing. · °
I)arties had not been expressed
.
l
anot 11e1
does the rule make any mroaf upon.' ti .1
principle, that the plaintiff must show first ;a
there was an actually concluded agreement an c-
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ce<lent to the instrument which is sought to be
rectified; and secondly, that such agreement has
been inaccurately represented in the instrument.
When this is proved either party may claim, in
spite of the Statute of Frauds, that the instrument on >vhich the other insists does not represent the real agreement."

*

*

*

''\Ye prefer to follow the rule which permits

the reformation of contracts in such cases as
this, particularly where, as here, the instrument
contains all of the terms necessary to comply
with the statute of frauds but through a mistake
of fact one or more of the essential terms is
omitted or by mistake incorrectly stated. The
adoption of this principle is in keeping with
the theory that the statute of frauds should not
abridge the remedy of reformation and should
not be used as a shield to prevent the instrument
from being reformed to show the true intent
of the parties. 'Ve, therefore, conclude that the
reformation is not prohibited by the statute of
frauds."
In that case, the purchaser sued for reformation
01an instrument of conveyance on the ground that
1
hrough mistake it included only a portion of the real
rroperty which the seller had agreed to convey. The
·ieller claimed there was no mistake since she had always
lnown how much land was conveyed and had intended
10
· convey no more.
This Court there sustained the
Jc\ion of the trial court in admitting evidence of the
'i·ansactions and negotiations surrounding the execu'irin 11 f the contract and upheld a reformation of the
11
' lllraet to include the additional land which the true
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agreement of the parties was determined to haw eiiutemplated.
Another case which reaffirmed the reformation u!
a contract to correct a material mistake is McMahun
v. Tanner, 122 Utah 333, 249 P2d 502 ( 1952).
A case holding that the seller had a right to rescind
the contract under facts very similar to those in the
present case is JV right v. Lowe, (Calif. D.C. 1956).
296 P2d 34. In that case, the buyer agreed "to assume
the assessments, and the property as delivered is to be
free of assessment." The purchase price was $12,200.00
and at the time the contract was entered into there were
street and sewer assessments of $8,000.00 which had
been levied and constituted a lien against the property.
The purchaser contended, as does the plaintiff here,
that the quoted language entitled him to deduct the
assessments from the purchase price. The seller con·
tended that the purchase price was to be paid by the
purchaser in addition to the assessments. The court
there held that there was a mutual mistake which en·
titled the seller to rescind the contract.
In the present case, the trial court by its summal)
judgment deprived the defendants of their right b<
prove their right to have the contract rescinded or re·
formed to correspond with the true agreement of tlir
parties.
Quite apart from the foregoing, the defendanll
were entitled to show that they hn<l substantially co!11
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plied with the terms of the contract but that Amoss
I 11 as in breach of the contract. In this regard, Bennion
\ undertook upou signing the Earnest .Money Receipt
to have all of his abstracts brought to date and all of
these were furnished to Amoss, with the exception of
an abstract covering 160 acres of land as to which the
abstracter, through no fault of Bennion, experienced
1ome delay iu bringing it to date. Except for the minor
matter of this abstract of 160 acres, which was ordered
about the middle of August, 1964, Bennion had, at the
time relations were ruptured by Amoss, performed
erery obligation required on his part. Amoss, on the
nther hand, had performed none of his obligations. He
had pai<l no consideration, and still hasn't; he had drawn
110 coutract of sale, and still hasn't; and, he had failed
to account as to the livestock he sold. Nor did he offer
to perform these obligations, within the required time.
Thus, Amoss is not entitled to demand specific performance in this case, for as it is stated in 49 Am J ur
.H (Specific Performance, Section 40) :
1

"The failure or inability or refusal to carry
out the terms of the contract at the time when
performance is due will ordinarily be grounds
for refusing specific performance, since specific
performance will not generally be decreed in
farnr of a party who has himself been in default,
or who has wilfullv violated his part of the contract, wherebv the. defendant has been deprived
of a substantral benefit under it."
1
1

And in 81 CJS 691 (Specific Performance, Section
I:]] I it

is stated:
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"Plaintiff in a suit
. for. speeifie 1'11ci·f'ofllllllltt
must s 110w that he is not m default."
This failure of performance by ..i:\moss entitle, Jefendants to resei11d the eoutraet. Pool z·. ~lJ ult f 1.' ,),)·•
Ctah 288, 185 Pae 714 ( HH\J) ; Xichuls i·. Hain(!/
(Okla 194:.!), 12:.! P2d 809; 17 A CJ S 5 rn (Contrat;i,
Section 422 ( 1) ) ; 17 Am J ur 2d 97U (Contracts, Ste·
tion 502).

A review of the judgment in this case (R. 73-7.i!
readily reveals the error of the determination made by
the lower eourt. X ot only does the court there holG
that the "assumed" indebtedness on the debts to the
Federal Land Hank, the P.C.A. and Schofield 'm
to be credited toward payment of the total purcha11·
price" but it orders the llennions to convey all of their
properties excepting the life estate "in a fenced tire·
acre parcel, upon which is located the Bennion home
and excepting also a forty-acre tract which is describea
by metes and bounds.

That the word "assume" as used in the Earnesi
l\Ioney Receipt would he held to be certain and subjet!
to enforcement without further evidence under !lit
facts of this case is disturbing, as will be discussed und'.r
Part II below. That a description of the fhe-:H:re ]ttr
111
estate is contained in the judgment when there .1s ' I
. . anyw 11ere m
. tl1e recur<I is. ·surpr11111~
such clesenption
. .
• .
.
t . , ud Loun1l•
Ilowevcr, 1t 1s totally mcred1hle that a me es J
•
•
•
.r
•
t· . d in the sun1·
descript1ou of the Keel place 1s con ame
..
t
ine11t11·l·
I
mary judgment, in view of the faet t 1a no
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I

l
.. . h E
is ma< e of it m t e arnest Money Receipt.
It becomes eren more incredible and disturbing in view
of the dired dispute, disclosed by the record, between
Jmoss and Bennion as to the acreage involved in that
tract. Amoss claims it is forty acres and the lower
court has upheld that claim without evidence even
illough he was aware that Bennion claimed it was sixty
;tres. The description contained in the judgment,
moreover, forms a rectangle ( R. 7 4) whereas the de1tription for the same parcel contained in the proposed
mortgage, prepared and submitted by Amoss himself
to G'ibson (Exhibit 5D) forms a triangle. On the other
iland, the reservation, according to Bennion, was of
aparcel enclosed on the East, South and 'Vest by
itraight lines but on the North by an irregular ledge
for which a description was to have been supplied at
alater date. The absurd division of the Keel place in
ll1e judgment was obviously concocted by someone
wholly unfamiliar with the land involved since it cuts
icross two pieces of irrigated lands at an awkward
angle leaving large portions of each unusable and
iuaking the irrigation system unsuitable. The resolution
nl this strongly disputed issue in Amoss' favor without
~iring Bennion a chance to be heard is characteristic
1
' l'the trial court's approach to this entire case and is
iotal!y unsupportable.

I ;ibatel'el'

Further, the judgme11t requires the Bennions to
r·rinvey to Amoss, all water rights except "the use of
irigatiun water for the five-acre life estate," the amount
1111
hil'h i.-; unspecified. No provision whatever is made
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l
I

for the reservation of any water for use on the Keel [ de
place despite llennion's repeated testimony that sucli ,~]
was also agreed to be reserved. Here again the Eames! tn
Money Receipt is totally silent, yet it is absurd to expecl he
that the Bennions would reserve forty acres of irrigateil de
hay crop lands without any water to go with them. 1 }'(
'Vithout water they would be practically nllueles~. ' Ai
Yet here again on a strongly disputed issue the trial Ai
court resolved it in favor of Amoss without permitting de
Bennion to be heard and present his case.
I rn1
These very serious errors and omissions are hut
further evidence of the insatiable desire of Amoss to
take every possible advantage and avoid every possible
liability in enforcing this contract. His conduct a1
disclosed by this record indicates clear overreaching
and a brazen insistance upon pressing his "legal rights''
to their outermost limit. He cannot be permitted to
so easily run roughshod over the Bennions' rights ano
deprive them of the rights and properties acquireil
through a long lifetime of hard work.

th1

W
ag
a
!'re
de1
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POINT II
THE LO,VER COURT ERRED IN RCLIX(,
THAT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, PLAINTIFF
"\VAS ENTITLED TO DEDUCT THE MORT·
GAGE DEBTS FR 0 M THE PURCHASE l'o
PRICE.
men! 11:11

It was clearly un derstoo d when t he agree
,
~
I T . I nn111,
made that only the amount of the F edera ~dll(
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11

debt would be deducted from the purchase price of
,~!97,000.00. Amoss and Brown agreed that this was
true but then Amoss reneged. The Court held, without
hearing any evidence, that the 'contract was clear and
definite in permitting deduction of the debts owed the
. I Federal Land Bank, the P .C.A. and Schofield, which
' Amoss agreed "to assume." The court disregarded
Amoss' admission that he did not have the right to
, I deduct the real estate commission which he also "as, rnmes" under the contract.

That the term "assume" is ambiguous as used in
1
the contract is readily apparent under the cases. In
' Wright v. Lowe, supra, for example, where the buyer
1
agreed "to assume existing loans and assessments" and
a dispute arose over his right to deduct those sums
!rom the purchase price. The court there affirmed the
i
denying specific performance, stating that:
"The written contract, in fact, not only admits
of two interpretations, one favorable to the seller
and one to the buyer, but it may well be that if
the contract were before us on a question of
construction rather than of rescission, the pref erred interpretation would be against the buyer
especially because he dictated the terms ... To
'assume' ordinarily means 'to pay.' " (Emphasis
added).

1

Similarly, in Willia7ns v. Manchester Bld,q. Supply
l'o., supra, the contract provided that the conveyed
lands were "subject to" a lien. The court there, in holduig the eontract unenforceable, noted the issues raised
111· ti . '
. .
· lls prov1s1on:
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"Did ( th.e pro:'ision) ... mean that the nudor.
on the dosmg of the sale, would be required t
pay off the indebtedness secured by the Inti;
or that the vendee could deduct from the pur·
chase money the amount of the debt due the
Land llank and assume the loan 1 Or rather
did it me~~n that the ve.ndee was buying the prop:
erty sub.Ject to the mdebtedness agaillst tlir
property, and it eould not deduct from the agree1l
purchase price the amount of the debt~ Tl1e
oral arguments of counsel for the parties dis·
closed that the parties' construction of these
provisions are not in accord. If the terms of tl1e
contract are such that they can be reasonahlr
misunderstood by the parties, clearly a eourt of
equity has neither the power nor the means !11
discover the intentions of the parties by mere
guess or conjecture."
The reasoning of the court on this issue, as well as the
issue of uncertainty ref erred under Point I abore. is
particularly instructive under the facts of the present
case.

POINT III
THE LO,VER COURT ERRED IN RULIXlr
THAT, AS A MATTER OF LA,V, THE CORPORATE DEFENDANT IS BOUND TO THE
SA.ME DEGREE AS THE INDIYJDCAL DE·
FENDANTS.
At the time the Earnest .Money Receipt was signei:
11
a portion of the properties involved in the prt1Jl ~f'
.
I.
C np·1111
sale were held by the Benmon Rane ung 01 ' ·
1
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i

l·tah corporation ..Mr. and .Mrs. Bennion each held
~tpproximately 37% of the corporation's stock and the
remaining 22j~ was distributed among their children.
Bennion's attorney, J. Lambert Gibson, held a qualifyuw0 share as a director.

That the proposed sale to Amoss involved virtually
all of the property and assets of the corporation is not
aisputed. Nor can it be claimed that the properties to
i lie conveyed were made in the usual and regular course
· uf its business. Thus, the proposed sale here involved
comes squarely within the provisions of Section 16-10;~, U.C.A., 1953, which provides:

l

1

"A sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge,
or other disposition of all, or substantially all,
the property or assets, with or without the good
will, of a corporation, if not made in the usual
and regular course of its business, may be made
upon such terms and conditions and for such
consideration ... as may be authorized in the
following manner:

(a) The board of directors shall adopt a resolution recommending such sale, lease, exchange,
mortgage, pledge, or other disposition and direeting the submission thereof to a vote at a
meeting of shareholders, which may be either
an annual or a special meeting.
( b) 'V ritten or printed notice shall be given
to each shareholder of record entitled to vote at
sueh meeting within the time and in the manner
proyided in this act for the giving of notice of
~neetings of shareholders, and, whether the meetJJtg- he an annual or a special meeting, shall state
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that the
or. one of the purposes , of'.sue·,1 i
. purpose,
.
mee t mg is to consider the proposed sale , lea.11·.·
e;x:c1rnnge, mortgage, pledge, or other disposi:
hon.
1'

( c) _At such meeting the shareholders mai
authorize such sa~e, le~~e, exchange, mortgag;, ,
pledge, or other d1spos1tion and mav fix ormai·
. tie
1 board of directors to'"' fix,' any ;r I
aut1ionze
all of the terms and conditions thereof and tli1 l
consideration to be received by the corporation
therefor.

*

*

*

( d) After such authorization by a vote 01 t'
shareholders, the board of directors neverthele11.
in its discretion, may abandon such sale, lease. p
exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other dispositio11 a
of assets, subject to the rights of third partic1 11
under any contracts relating thereto, withoul ~
further action or approval by shareholders." n
However, at the time the document was signea
there had been no such meeting of directors and no slepi
were ever taken to notify the remaining stockholder)
and obtain their approval or dissent. Had these stepi
been taken as required by this statute it is entire!!
likely that the disputed matters would have been re·
. ]t
solved or the proposed sale cancelled at that tune. ·
is the purpose of the above provision to permit suet
a substantial transaction to be reviewed by those inter·
ested and subjected to close analysis rather than. con·
nrht1on)
summated on the spur o f the moment un der co
.
. k
.
d
d.
d n·erreacl1·
con d uc1ve to m1sta re, m1sun erstan mg an (
ing. It means board action by the board, acting as suci'
I
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cl, i :i!lll not merely the acts of its members. See Section

I !ti-10-33, U.C.A. 1953.

II,

Certainly Amoss cannot claim ignorance of this
requirement by statute, he being a practicing attorney.

ltl\

Although there is a split of authority as to whether
m !he corporation itself may assert the invalidity of the
or
llil mle, the better reasoned cases hold that it may do so.
ion See cases collected in Annotation, 58 ALR 2d 784,
Section 8, page 795.

~t,

,

I
ut

In Michigan Wolverine Student Cooperative, Inc.
i'. Goodyear. (Mich., 1946), 22 NW 2d 884, an un-

profitable but solvent corporation sued to set aside a
'.~'.1 aeed conveying the corporation's property to the detic1 fendant. The agreement was made by the board of
oul <lirectors without stockholder assent. The statute inrolved there was patterned after the Model Business
nea Corporation Act as is the Utah provision quoted above.
eri The Court there set aside the sale on the ground of
Im failure to follow the prescribed statutory procedure.

:•i.

W In .Toseph Greempon's Sons Iron & Steel Co. v.
rel! Pecos Valle.If Gas Co., (Del. 1931), 156 Atl. 350, the
re· aefendant corporation defended its refusal to deliver
·I! pipe under a contract, entered into by its president,
;uc~ upon the ground he was not authorized to make the
ter iale. The court there held that although the president
:on· nad authority to carry on the usual business of the
ion' corporation, this authority did not extend to matters
id1· ' i'n1 ·
·
A s to t hese, proper
,
U.Jor l'o11cern to the corporation.
;ur approval and assent of the corporation was required.
1

1
'
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Here again the plaintiff attempts to push his !to·•i
rights to the limit, regardless of its effect upon ;l;t
defendants. Thus, plai~tiff's counsel first stated, citin~
cases, that the corporation had no standing to raise tlw
defense of the statutory requirement referred to abore. I
(R'. ~23, 124, 127, 170). ~hen, in response to tha! I
pos1t10n, however, upon which the authorities differ. '
as noted above, the defendants moved that Don Ben·
nion, a stockholder, be permitted to intervene to ra~e
that defense in case the court should rule with tne I
plaintiff on the issue, plaintiff switched his position ann
claimed that the motion was untimely, (R. 178) ana
that any dissatisfied stockholders should seek their relief
against the corporation. (R. 179).
Certainly someone is entitled to raise this defemt
whether it be the corporation, an officer or a storl·
holder. It was purposed for the protection of the cor
poration and stockholders against precisely the problem
involved here. And the plaintiff cannot be perrnitten
in this proceeding to insist upon the "be damned 11
they do and be damned if they don't" approach.

I

All of the authorities and issues raised as to tir
individual defendants are, of course, equally apphc:il!lr :
I
and available as to the corporate defendant.
'
POINT IV

D NOT

DE

IF THE CONTRACT SHOUL
, \!
HELD UNENFORCEABLE, THIS APPr.. ,
MAY BE PREMATURE.
I

52
I

l

On the basis of the present record in this case,
!be Earnest Money Receipt should be held unenforceable as a matter of law due to its many infirmities as
vointed out above. In the interest of justice and to
I aroid the expense of further expensive proceedings in
I this case, this Court should so rule.
Should it, however, be held to be enforceable, it
appears that this appeal may be premature in view of
this Court's recent pronouncement in Walker v. Thayn,
17 Utah 2d 120, 405 P2d 342 ( 1965), which it is defendants' duty to bring to the Court's attention. As
will be noted in its judgment (R. 73-75) the lower
wurt retained jurisdiction of the case to implement
!he terms of the contract which it found to exist.
Respectfully submitted,
Ernest F. Baldwin Jr., and
Milton A. Oman
By: MILTON A. OMAN
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
909 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah and
701 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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